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Rewards at the top: the European Union 
 
Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos and Edward C. Page 
 
Europe-wide administrative systems have had a strong track record of innovation. The 
Frankish Empire, above all under Charlemagne, is generally held to have been the 
cradle of feudalism – a system that directly grew out of the dominant arrangements 
for paying imperial officials. Napoleon’s integration of Europe left a legacy of 
national and local institutions which appear to remain to the present day. The 
administrative system of the EU is an exception to this tradition. Certainly Monnet’s 
conception of a European administration consisting of just a few hundred European 
civil servants who would, in turn, set thousands of national experts to work, and make 
firms and governments serve the aims of the Schuman Plan (Monnet, 1976) was in 
many ways revolutionary. Yet the methods used to establish the independence of the 
EU civil service from national interests involved the elaboration of a system of 
rewards for officials which reflects more closely the philosophy of the nineteenth-
century national Rechtsstaat than the pay schemes of many member states.  
 
As a supranational organisation the EU and its predecessors have sought to limit the 
degree to which ‘national interests’ exercise an influence outside the Councils. This 
basic principle can be found in the oath of office according to which Commissioners 
can ‘neither solicit or accept instructions from any action incompatible with the 
supranational character of his tasks’. The supranationality of the whole European civil 
service is enshrined in the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European 
Economic Community appended to the Treaty of Rome. This protocol gave the newly 
established institutions all the formal trappings of the diplomatic representations of a 
state such as inviolability of premises and free movement of representatives and 
sought to seclude European civil servants from national governments by ensuring that 
they are paid by the European level of government, exempting their salaries from 
national income taxes and by providing a series of financial benefits to them. The pay 
system that subsequently emerged, has come to resemble the traditional Hegelian 
principle according to which the official is 
 
Deliberately insulated from the changing state of the economy so that he 
can devote himself entirely to the service of the state and serve its 
purposes. The measurement of pay takes place on the basis of what is 
required to maintain his lifestyle […] if there is a rise in prices or a 
general rise in living conditions, then too salaries must be increased, but 
the regulation of pay is not in the form of struggles over wages and all that 
goes with them as in the private sector, nut through legislative acts of 
state. (Hintze, 1964, pp. 75-6). 
 
 
Paying the people who run Europe 
Many HPOs (in the sense used in this book) are not on the EU’s payroll. The salaries 
of the hundreds of membersi of the Council of Ministers (i.e. national government 
ministers) and the 27 of the 28 membersii of the European Council (i.e. the Heads of 
State or Government) as well as the heads of the national permanent representations 
to the EU are paid from national public funds and are subject to national taxation on 
them. For many years the same applied to MEPs, even after (and despite) the direct 
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elections that first took place in 1979, thus leading to vast disparities between themiii. 
However, as a result of a reform adopted in 2005 (European Parliament, 2005), as of 
June 2009 all (751iv) MEPs receive the same salary – set at 38.5 per cent of the salary 
of a member of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), i.e. approximately €7,665 - and 
will pay income tax to the EU budget though individual member states retain the right 
to impose additional taxation. The Statute for MEPs also stipulates that during the 
transitional period (which may not exceed the length of two EP terms, i.e. a total of 
ten years) each member state may apply different rules (in relation to salary, 
transitional allowance and pension) to the MEPs who are elected by its citizens. The 
transitional arrangements may not be less favourable than those applied to national 
MPs of the country in question and all payments will be made from the budget of that 
country (Art. 29). In addition, the 27 Commissioners, their respective 27 chefs de 
cabinet, the Secretary General and her two deputies along with the 36 Directors 
General and the 24 deputy Directors General in charge of 35 Directorates General and 
offices within the Commission, the Executive Secretary General, two deputy 
Secretaries General and the Chief Operating Officer in the European External Action 
Service, the 27 judges, 8 advocates general and one registrar of the ECJ, the 27 judges 
of the Court of First Instance and the seven judges of the Civil Service Tribunal, the 
27 members of the European Court of Auditors, the Secretary General and the 11 
Directors General within the EP’s Secretariat, the Council’s Secretary General, and 
the eight Directors General within the Council, the Heads of the agencies set up in the 
context of the EU’s common foreign and security policyv, or police and judicial co-
operation mattersvi, the six members of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Executive 
Board and the Heads of the 11 Directorates General within the ECBvii, the nine 
members of the Management Board of the European Investment Bank, the European 
Ombudsmanviii, the European Data Protection Supervisor and his deputy, the Heads of 
the Communityix and other executive agenciesx, the Director of the European 
Administrative School. Thus, whereas in the early 1990s only a minority of top EU 
officials received salaries from the EU (Page and Wouters, 1994), now the obverse is 
true. Two factors – one procedural and one substantive - appear to explain the delayxi 
in bringing about this change. First, the adoption of the reform required (i) the 
unanimous support of the Council as well (ii) the majority of MEPs some of whom 
had much to lose from itxii. Although the growth in the EP’s powers since the mid-
1980s has turned it into a co-legislator, the institution needed time to mature in terms 
of this key aspect of its operation, which risked affecting its credibility.  
 
As the 2011 budget indicates (Official Journal L 68, 15 March 2011), in addition to a 
total of €67,755,185 that corresponds to their salaries (i.e. €90,219.95 or £79,168 or 
$128,789 per MEPxiii), MEPs also receive significant sums in various kinds of 
allowances (title I, budget chapter 10) to the tune of €123,123,220xiv (i.e. 
€163,945.699, or £143,862 or $234,032) per MEPxv).  
 
The single largest amount in that category was devoted to MEPs’ travel and 
subsistence expenses in connection with travelling to and from the places of work and 
with other duty travel (€75,396,756). Reforms adopted in 2005 replaced the flat-rate 
travel allowance (which meant that some MEPs used economy class tickets but 
received refunds for more expensive ones) with the reimbursement of actual costs 
incurred (BBC News online, 23 June 2005). The second largest amount (€38,330,147) 
is allocated to the ‘general expenditure allowance’ which covers expenses resulting 
from the parliamentary activities of MEPs in the member state where they are elected. 
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Finally, MEPs also receive €9,396,317 for ‘other travel expenses’ (i.e. travel expenses 
incurred in the member state of election and repatriation expenses). 
 
In addition, MEPs receive a sum used for the staff that they employ. Under the 
‘parliamentary assistance’ heading, this amounted to €176,043,709xvi, i.e. approx. 
€243,412 (£213,594 or $347,471) per MEP in 2011. The assistants to MEPs perform 
important and extremely varied roles and the improvement of their precarious status 
has been a longstanding issue within the EP. In the past, MEPs had almost complete 
freedom in that aspect of their work. As a result, problems arose including the 
employment of relatives, tax avoidance, and the non-payment of pension-related and 
social security contributions. As of June 2009, assistants who are based in Brussels 
(where most of the EP’s work is done) are covered by the statute which covers EU 
contract staffxvii. The contracts of other assistants is managed by certified paying 
agents with whom the EP concludes model contracts. These agents are responsible for 
compliance with the corresponding national legislation regarding social security and 
tax. Though MEPs remain free to choose their assistants, define the duration of their 
contract and allocate tasks to them, they are not allowed to employ their close 
relatives and the EP’s services handles the contracts of and salary payments to 
assistants (up to €16,914 per month per MEP in 2008 figures, including travel 
expenses, social security contributions and tax paid upon presentation of invoices). 
MEPs have the right to utilise up to a quarter of their parliamentary assistance 
allowance for research studies and other advisory work (Euractiv, 14 July 2008, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/meps-set-stricter-rules-assistant-payment-
scandal/article-174207). 
 
The EU also contributes to the pensions schemes of MEPs -- an appropriation of 
€14,664,889 in 2011 which includes €11,131,000 for retirement pensions (i.e. 
approximately €14,822 or £13,006 or $21,158 per MEP)xviii, €406,742 for invalidity 
pensions and €3,072,147 for survivors’ pensions.  
 
Furthermore, the sum of €3,477,040 has been allocated to MEPs for accident 
insurance, the reimbursement of medical expenses for MEPs and loss and theft of 
their personal effects and €800,000 for language and computer courses for MEPs. 
Though there are other EU-funded activities that facilitate the work (and life) of 
MEPs, they are indirect and cannot be ascribed to individual MEPs. These include 
current administrative expenditure and expenditure relating to the political and 
information activities of the political groups and non-attached MEPs (€54,850,000), 
contributions to European political parties (€17,400,000)xix as well as €569,844,235 
for the permanent and temporary staff of the EPxx.  
 
How do these sums compare to those made to other relevant categories? It has been 
argued that under the previous arrangements ‘MEP payments were around two thirds 
below top salary levels in 1973, they were more or less equal to them in the middle of 
the 1980s, and they are currently around one half above them in 1993’ because these 
expenses could (at the time) be used in part as supplementary income (Page and 
Wouters, 1994, p. 203). Given the introduction of the aforementioned reforms, it 
would now be more apposite to compare the basic gross salary of an MEP (€7,665 per 
month under the new statute) with the highest salary of a European Commission 
official (in December 2010 this was set at €18,370.84 for an official on step 3 of 
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grade 16 on the matrix). After the European elections of 2009 the former corresponds 
to 41.72 per cent of the latter.  
 
 
Is EU Service Attractive? 
 
The pay of EU civil servants at first appeared extremely attractive in the early 1990s 
since ‘a newly-appointed junior professor at the European University Institute, for 
example, on an A5 step 1 salary would be earning £51,067 gross, before allowances 
and adjustments for local cost of living’ (Page and Wouters, 1994, p. 204), a strong 
incentive to attract high calibre officials from across the Union.  
 
Although Monnet’s intention was to establish a civil service devoid of emphasis on 
nationality and national quotas (Monnet, 1976, p. 450) the avoidance of major 
imbalances, has been historically a major expressed objective of recruitment policy 
(Page, 1997, Ch. 3; Page and Wouters, 1994). Just as shares of seats in Parliament and 
numbers of commissioners supplied by member states are related to population size, 
the system of recruitment and pay has also sought to secure fair shares in the senior 
ranks of the administration. However, the enlargement of the EU has led to a new 
balance within each of the relevant institutions. The two institutions where the most 
significant changes have been observed are the College of Commissioners and the 
ECJ. Unlike the EP and the senior civil servants where the size of the population 
remains de facto an important determinant of the distribution of seats and posts 
(especially in the EP), in the EU of 27 member states, each member state has the right 
to nominate just one Commissioner and judge, irrespective of the size of its 
population. As a result, the more populus member states (Germany, France, Italy, 
Britain and Spain) have lost the right to nominate a second Commissioner each. In the 
administrative echelon of the Commission, smaller countries tended to have one 
Director General each, while larger ones tended to have two or three (Page and 
Wouters, 1994, p. 204). 
 
In the past officials fell into one of five major pay categories (A, B, C, and D and the 
LA grade for translators), a series of divisions within each grade (from A1 to A8 and 
so on) with a series of steps within each grade division. Staff regulations currently 
divide officials into two groups, namely Assistants (AST) and Administrators (AD) 
(Art. 5). The former comprises eleven grades, corresponding to executive, technical 
and clerical duties. The latter comprises twelve grades, corresponding to 
administrative, advisory, linguistic and scientific duties. Since 2006 they are placed 
on a single pay scale that is composed of 16 grades, each of which is sub-divided into 
five seniority stepsxxi with officials moving up one step every two years. Assistants 
occupy grades 1-11 while Administrators occupy grades 5-16. Each grade and step is 
represented on the EU servants pay matrix. The pay grading system for EU 
employees applies uniformly to all nationalities and all major posts. 
 
In the early 1990s Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain were under-represented with 
only 63 per cent, 70 per cent, 76 per cent and 87 per cent of the employees that one 
would expect on the basis of population. By contrast, Belgium and Luxembourg, i.e. 
the main host countries were over-represented among A grade employees (421 and 
1,095 per cent respectively) and the same applied to other smaller countries such as 
Ireland (320 per cent), Denmark (191 per cent) and Greece (191 per cent). Germany, 
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Britain and Italy were especially strongly under-represented at the level of grade A1 
personnelxxii - 63 per cent, 70 per cent and 76 per cent respectively – (Page and 
Wouters, 1994, p. 205).  
 
Two decades later, in April 2011xxiii, i.e. after both the ‘big bang enlargement’ of 
2004 and the Kinnock reforms of the early 2000s which involved the introduction of 
new staff regulations that enshrined merit as the main criterion for promotion 
(Kassim, 2008), Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland were under-represented 
with only 51 per cent, 39 per cent, 84 per cent, 76 per cent and 66 per cent of the AD 
and AST Commission employees that one would expect on the basis of population, 
having been joined by Denmark and Belgium (58 and 86 per cent respectively). By 
contrast, Luxembourg remains over-represented among these employees (858 per cent 
respectively) and the same applies to other small countries such as Slovenia (228 per 
cent), Ireland (226 per cent) and Greece (163 per cent). As regards the top two tiers 
(AD16 and AD15) of the European Commission’s officialdom, Germany, Italy and 
France remain under-represented - 75 per cent, 81 per cent and 88 per cent 
respectively – and have been joined by Poland (28 per cent) but Britain’s rate has 
increased to 95 per cent. By contrast, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, 
Luxembourg and Slovenia are over-represented (371 per cent, 306 per cent, 379 per 
cent, 206 per cent, 842 per cent and 207 per cent) while another small country, 
namely the Czech Republic is severely under-represented with its nationals holding a 
quarter (26 per cent) of the top posts one would expect on the basis of the country’s 
population.  
 
Although levels of remuneration provide a common set of incentives so as to attract 
EU citizens from all member states, the disincentives which they must counterbalance 
vary along national lines. There are numerous causes of variation but the most 
important are national differences in pay for civil servants, the costs of relocation and 
the inability to speak the language of the country where EU posts are located.   
 
Although the expatriate allowance (see below) is not paid to EU officials who live 
and work in their country of origin (thus leading to discrepancies between officials on 
the same salary point), the intensity of the incentives varies along national lines. A 
system that is designed to attract candidates from states amongst which pay and the 
cost of living are unevenly distributed, inevitably creates much stronger incentives for 
candidates from countries where pay and costs are lower. Moreover, the same system 
is likely to provide greater incentives even in sectors where there is no shortage of 
candidates. Thus, to the extent that shortages play a role in determining the overall 
rate of adjustment of the matrix, they are likely to lead to pay rates that are clearly 
above those required to attract candidates from many member states and sectors or 
specialisations. In other words, the allocation of financial rewards is bound to be 
inefficient when construed exclusively on the basis of recruitment from across the EU 
since varying rewards on the basis of nationality or sector or not varying it on the 
basis of hierarchy is as inconceivable in the EU as it is in its member statesxxiv.   
 
If nationality were not an issue, it might be argued that pay is above the level required 
to attract candidates.  This is due to a number of reasons. As survey evidence has 
suggested in the past, commitment to European integration is an important motive for 
(especially senior) EU officials (Page and Wouters, 1994; Shore and Black, 1992). 
More recent research indicates that top Commission officials have a slight preference 
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for supranationalism but there is also considerable support for intergovernmentalism 
amongst them (Hooghe, 2001). Since senior posts (Directors General, Deputy 
Directors General and, to some extent, Directors) were traditionally filled by 
parachutistes – i.e. people who have made their careers outside of the EU civil 
service – it cannot be argued that the matrix was designed to encourage the 
recruitment of officials to junior posts so that they can subsequently be promoted to 
top jobs. Between 1975 and 1995, 81.8 per cent of A1 and 65.7 per cent of A2 
officials had been parachuted into the Commission (Page, 1997). In the late 1990s, for 
only 18 per cent of top Commission officials the job in the Commission was their first 
job and close to 45 per cent had extensive experience outside the public sector 
(Hooghe, 2001). In 2011 only 19 per cent of the Directors General had at least one 
year’s experience outside the public sector and its duration varies from one (one case) 
to five years in half (i.e. three, all British) of these casesxxv.  
 
 
The Matrix, Supplements and Deductions 
 
The matrix is central to the rewards of top EU officials since it directly determines 
their gross pay. A series of weightings reflecting local costs of living are used so as to 
make the matrix applicable to all EU officials throughout the world, including 
Commissioners, Judges and other top officials since their basic salaries are related to 
the top step of the top grade (third step of grade 16). Changes in the matrix directly 
affect changes in supplements to and deductions from income (see below). 
 
The basic monthly salary of senior EU officials is equal to an amount resulting from 
application of the following percentages to that basic salary: 138 per cent for the 
Presidents of the Commission and the ECJ, 125 per cent for the Vice-Presidents of the 
Commission, 112.5 per cent for other Commissioners, ECJ Judges and Advocates 
General, 101 per cent for the ECJ’s Registrar and 104, 100 and 90 per cent 
respectively for the President, the members and the Registrar of the EU Civil Service 
Tribunal.  
 
The supplements to officials’ income take various forms and appear in the staff 
regulations (Council of Ministers (EEC & EURATOM), 1962 as amended in 2008). 
Officials receive an expatriation allowance equalxxvi to 16 per cent of the total of the 
basic salary, household allowance and dependent child allowance to which the official 
is entitled. The household allowance (whose payment is subject to status) is equal to 
€159.49 plus 2 per cent of an official’s basic salary. The dependent child allowance is 
equal to €348.50 per month for each dependent child automatically for children under 
eighteen years of age and on application for children between eighteen and twenty-six 
who are in education or are receiving vocational training. The education allowance is 
equal to the actual education costsxxvii incurred up to a maximum of €236.46 per 
month for each dependent child who is at least five years old and in regular full-time 
attendance at a primary or secondary schoolxxviii which charges fees or at an 
establishment of higher education. An installation allowance (equal to two months’ 
basic salary in the case of an official who is entitled to the household allowance, and 
equal to one month’s basic salary in other cases) is paid to an official for whom a 
change in the place of residence is required. It is weighted at the rate fixed for the 
place where the official is employed. On termination of service officials who provide 
evidence of change of address are entitled to a resettlement allowance (equal to two 
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months’ basic salary in the case of an official who is entitled to the household 
allowance or to one month's basic salary in other cases), provided that they have 
completed four years of service and do not receive a similar allowance in their new 
employment. Furthermore, officials are entitled to be paid in each calendar year a sum 
equivalent to the cost of travel from their place of employment to their place of origin 
for themselves and, if they are entitled to the household allowance, for their spouse 
and dependants.  
 
EU officials who live and work in a third country receive an allowance for living 
conditions that is fixed, according to the official’s place of employment, as a 
percentage of a reference amount which comprises their total basic salary, plus the 
expatriation allowance, household allowance and dependent child allowance, less any 
compulsory deductions. This allowance rises as a function of distance. A supplement 
is added to it depending on the distance by train between the place of employment and 
the place of originxxix.  
 
Commissioners and ECJ Judges receive a residence allowance equal to 15 per cent of 
their basic salary as well as a monthly entertainment allowance. They are also entitled 
to (a) an installation allowance equal to two months’ basic salary on taking up his 
duties and a resettlement allowance equal to one month’s basic salary on ceasing to 
hold office and (b) the reimbursement of travel expenses incurred by themselves and 
for members of their family, and reimbursement of the cost of removal of their 
personal effects and furniture, including insurance against ordinary risks (theft, 
breakage, fire) upon taking office.  
 
The remuneration of the officials and other servants of the Communities is reviewed 
annually by the Council of Ministers (on the basis of qualified majority voting) in the 
light of a report by the Commission based on a joint index prepared by Eurostat in 
agreement with the national statistical offices of the Member States. In the context of 
the review the Council considers whether remuneration should be adjusted, taking 
particular account ‘of any increases in salaries in the public service and the needs of 
recruitmentxxx’ (Art. 65 of Staff Regulations). Eurostat’s report focuses on ‘changes in 
the cost of living in Brussels [the Brussels International Index], the economic parities 
between Brussels and certain places in the Member States, and changes in the 
purchasing power of salaries in national civil services in central government’ (Art. 1, 
Annex XI, Staff Regulations). The adjustment is presented in net terms as a ‘uniform 
across-the-board percentage’. The updated tables take effect in July but the matrix can 
be upgraded more than once a year and even retrospectively so as to correct mistakes 
or when more information on the cost of living and salaries paid in national 
administrations becomes available. 
 
As Page and Wouters note (1994, pp. 210-11) the Council, which actually makes the 
pay awards, is bound by its own regulation to accept the pay increases calculated on 
the basis of the formula. In 1981 it sought to implement the 3.3 per cent increase 
recommended by the Commission only for the lowest paid officials while paying the 
other grades a flat rate increase bringing the average pay increase to just 1.5 per cent.  
It justified this decision on the grounds that (a) the regulation setting out the 
mechanism for updating the matrix referred to two additional criteria, namely the 
recruitments needs of the institutions and the ‘economic and social situation’ of the 
Community, and (b) there was a serious crisis in Community finances. The 
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Commission challenged the legality of this decision in the ECJ and won (Case 59/81). 
However, the revised staff regulations currently in force after the Kinnock reforms 
stipulate that ‘If there is a serious and sudden deterioration in the economic and social 
situation within the Community, assessed in the light of objective data supplied for 
this purpose by the Commission, the latter shall submit appropriate proposals on 
which the Council shall act’ (Art. 10, Annex XI, Staff Regulations). These 
arrangements are applicable between July 2004 and December 2012 and are meant to 
be reviewed on the basis of a report and, where appropriate, a proposal by the 
Commission (Art. 15). The Commission will conduct a review of the formula in 2012. 
 
In November 2009, the Commission proposed an increase of 3.7% for staff salaries 
and pensions but the Council amended it by fixing new levels on the basis of an 
increase of 1.85% so as to take account of the economic and financial crisis but 
without invoking the special procedure provided for by the Staff Regulations in case 
of a serious and sudden deterioration in economic conditions. The Commission took 
the Council to court arguing that by doing so the Council had exceeded the powers 
conferred on it by the Staff Regulations, a view with which the Council disagreed. 
The Court found in the Commission’s favour and annulled the corresponding parts of 
the Council’s decision (C-40/10, European Commission v. Council of the European 
Union, Official Journal, C30, 29 January 2011, p. 10). 
 
It is widely and erroneously believed that EU officials do not pay taxes. Although 
they do not pay income taxes on their salaries in their native country or in their 
country of residence, they are liable to pay all provincial and local taxes as well as, of 
course, taxes on what they buy as well, on what they earn apart from their salaries, 
and they must pay estate duties and other such taxes. In addition they pay a 
Community tax and a ‘crisis levy’ or ‘temporary contribution’ (Page and Wouters, 
1994).  
 
The Community Tax is progressive. For each band of income a differential percentage 
is paid, initially rising from 8 per cent in the first to 10 per cent in the second, then ten 
further steps increasing by 2.5 per cent each to 35 per cent, a penultimate step of 40 
per cent and anything earned over the top rate of this band taxed at 45 per cent. Since 
the budget crisis of 1981 there has been a second tax. The ‘crisis levy’ was introduced 
from July 1981 for a period of ten years. After 1991, and substantial industrial action 
by EU civil servants, it was replaced by a ‘temporary contribution’, again for a period 
of ten years, and was set at a standard rate of 5.8 per cent. Since May 2004 a ‘special 
levy’ is applied (until the end of 2012) on the basic salary minus (i) social security 
and pension contributions and the tax, before special levy, payable by an official in 
the same grade and step without dependants, and (ii) an amount equal to the basic 
salary of an official in grade 1, step 1. The rate rises from 2.50 per cent in 2004 to 
5.50 per cent in 2011 (Council of Ministers, 1968). The same applies to President and 
Members of the Commission, the President, Judges, Advocates-General and Registrar 
of the Court of Justice and the President, Members and Registrar of the Court of First 
Instance (Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 1084/92 of 28 April 1992, 
OJ L 117, 1 May 1992).  
 
Commissioners and Judges are entitled to a pension from the age of 65. The amount 
of the pension is 4.275 per cent of the basic salary last received for each full year in 
office and one-twelfth of that sum for each complete month, the maximum being 70 
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per cent of the basic salary last received (Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1292/2004 of 30 April 2004 L 243, 15 July 2004).  
 
Officials who have completed at least ten years in service are entitled to a pensionxxxi 
up to 70 per cent of the final basic salary carried by the last grade in which the official 
was classified for at least one year. Officials contribute one third of the cost of this 
pension scheme to the tune of 10.25 per cent of their basic salary – up from 8.25 in 
1993 (Page and Wouters, 1994, p. 208). Moreover, social security arrangements cover 
between 80 and 100 per cent of the expenditure incurred by sickness. 
 
Officials who travel in the course of their duties receive a daily subsistence allowance 
which comprises a flat-rate sum that covers ‘all expenses incurred by the person on 
mission: breakfast, two main meals and incidental expenses, including local travel’. 
Accommodation costs, including local taxes, are reimbursed up to a maximum fixed 
for each country, on production of supporting documents’ (Art. 10, Annex VII, Staff 
Regulations). Commissioners and Judges receive 105 % of that amount for the same 
purposes, in addition to travel and accommodation expenses. Also, officials who, by 
reason of their duties, regularly incur entertainment expenses may be granted a fixed 
rate allowance determined by the appointing authority.  In addition, senior 
management staff (i.e. Directors-General or their equivalent in grade AD 16 or AD 15 
and Directors or their equivalent in grade AD 15 or AD 14) who do not have an 
official car at their disposal may receive a fixed allowance not exceeding €892,42 a 
year to cover normal travel within the boundaries of the town where they are 
employed (Art. 15, Annex VII, Staff Regulations). 
 
A monthly entertainment allowance is also paid to Commissioners, ECJ Judges, 
Advocates-General and Registrar. This amounts to €1418 for the Presidents of the 
Commission and ECJ, €911 for the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, €607 for 
other Commissioners, €608 for ECJ judges and Advocates-General and €554 for the 
ECJ’s Registrar. Presiding Judges of Chambers of the Court and the First Advocate-
General also receive during their term of office a special duty allowance of €811 per 
month. These allowances are increased annually by the Council (Council Regulation 
(EC, ECSC, Euratom) No 2778/98 of 17 December 1998 L 347, 23 December 1998). 
 
While in post, Commissioners are banned by the Treaty of Rome from any paid work. 
However, the potential for rewards to be reaped after a career as a Commissioner is 
undoubtedly significant. For example, as Page and Wouters point out (1994, pp. 209-
10), Sir Christopher Tugendhat, Commissioner between 1977 and 1985,  
‘went on to become, among other things, a Director of the National 
Westminster Bank, of Commercial Union Assurance as well as Chairman 
of the Civil Aviation Authority and the Royal Institute for International 
Affairs.  There can be little doubt that the prestige and experience 
associated with having been a senior Commissioner makes former office 
holders attractive candidates for such positions.  Precisely how much 
value was added to Tugendhat's career by his appointment in the 
Commission is not easy to determine since his qualities were obviously 
appreciated before he went to Brussels. Ηe was a director of Sunningdale 
Oils and Phillips Petroleum International (UK) in the early 1970s. 
Moreover a rewarding position in the private sector is not, as far as can be 
ascertained, the destination of most ex-commissioners. Of the 59 ex-
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commissioners, the subsequent careers of only 36 could be traced -- the 
remainder died (3), disappeared without trace from the standard 
biographical references (15) or departed office too recently to be included 
in them (5).  Of the 36, 16 went back to positions in domestic politics (at 
positions ranging from mayor of a small town through MP to President or 
Prime Minister), a further six went back into law (3) or teaching (3), six 
became eminent members of public organisations (such as Victor Bodson 
who became President of the International Association of French 
Speaking Parliamentarians) and eight went into private industry, usually 
in a directorial or managerial capacity.  Of these four were British, two 
were Belgian, one was Luxembourgeois and one was French (the latter 
going into a semi-public rather than a private business).’ 
 
Arrangements have been in place at least since the early 1970s to facilitate the life of 
Judges and Commissioners after the end of their service for these two institutions. For 
three years from the first day of the month following that in which they cease to hold 
office, they receive a monthly transitional allowance. The amount depends on their 
length of service. It rises from 40 per cent of their last basic salary when they were in 
office if their period of service is less than two years, to 60 per cent if it is between 
ten and 15 years and to more than 65 per cent of the same salary in other cases 
(Regulation (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) No 1546/73 of the Council of 4 June 1973, OJ L 
155, 11 June 1973). These generous arrangements can be seen as an attempt to ensure 
that these HPOs are under no financial pressure to rush into new jobs that might 
conflict with their EU role. In addition, Art. 213 of the Treaty stipulates inter alia that 
(i) Commissioners have, upon leaving office, ‘a duty to behave with integrity and 
discretion as regards the acceptance […] of certain appointments or benefits’ and (ii) 
the Council or the Commission have the right to take legal action against breaches. 
 
However, what became known as the (infamous) ‘Bangemann case’ in 1999 led to the 
adoption of rules whose aim is to ensure that problems of this kind are less likely to 
occur. Martin Bangemann - a lawyer, former MEP, Federal MP, leader of Germany’s 
Liberals (FDP) and economics minister in successive German governments led by 
Helmut Kohl - served as a Commissioner (under Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer) 
between 1989 and 1999, initially in charge of the internal market and, since 1995 
responsible for industrial affairs, IT and telecommunications. In June 1999 – i.e. prior 
to the completion of his term of office, he decided to leave the Commission and, with 
immediate effect, take up a lucrative offer to join the board of Telefónicaxxxii, a major 
company that was active in the policy domain (telecommunications) covered by his 
portfolio (Financial Times, 1 July 1999, p. 26). His decision was vehemently opposed 
by the EP, the Commission, the Council (Financial Times, 23 July 1999, p. 2), other 
politicians (including the leader of his own party), and the German government, 
though he maintained that he had breached no rules. As a result, the Council took 
legal action against him at the ECJ aimed at depriving him of his pension rights for 
breach of Art. 213 of the Treaty. 
 
Following this embarrassing controversy, Romano Prodi, then new president of 
the Commission, introduced a Code of Conduct for Commissioners stipulating 
that  
‘Whenever Commissioners intend to engage in an occupation during the 
year after they have ceased to hold office, whether this be at the end of 
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their term or upon resignation, they shall inform the Commission in good 
time. The Commission shall examine the nature of the planned 
occupation. If it is related to the content of the portfolio of the 
Commissioner during his/her full term of office, the Commission shall 
seek the opinion of an ad hoc ethics committee. In the light of the 
committee’s findings it will decide whether the planned occupation is 
compatible with the last paragraph of Article 213(2) of the Treaty.’ 
 
The Council subsequently decided to drop the case in the ECJ once Bangemann 
agreed in writing to delay taking up his new job by a year, in line with the 
Commissions’s new Code of Conduct for Commissioners, not to work for another 
telecommunications company during this period, and not to represent any third party 
in dealings with EU institutions for two years after his departure from Brussels and to 
‘permanently continue to safeguard’ any confidential information he may have 
become aware of as a Commissioner (Council of Ministers (ECSC/EC/EURATOM), 
1999).  
 
In August 2010 the Commission’s ad hoc ethics committee forced Charlie McCreevy 
(internal market and financial services Commissioner between 2004 and 2009) to 
resign from the board of a London-based investment bank due to a conflict of interest. 
This was the first case of this kind (http://euobserver.com/?aid=30996, 26 April 2011, 
accessed on 11 May 2011). In an effort to force the Commission to enhance its code 
of conduct (in line with President Barroso’s earlier promise) the European Parliament 
voted in October 2010 to withhold some of the monies that had been earmarked for 
former Commissioners (http://euobserver.com/?aid=31101, 22 October 2010, 
accessed on 11 May 2011). The revised code of conduct was adopted by the 
Commission in April 2011, i.e. after former industrial affairs Commissioner Günter 
Verheugen had set up a lobbying consultancy firm and former maritime affairs 
Commissioner Joe Borg had joined a PR consultancy firm “actively lobbying on 
maritime issues” (http://euobserver.com/?aid=31248, 11 November 2010, accessed on 
11 May 2011).  
 
The revised code extends the remit of the ethics committee (which obtains the power, 
if requested by the President of the Commission, to issue opinions “on any general 
ethical question” concerning the interpretation of the code), introduces guiding 
criteria for its assessments and, for the first time, compels it to make public both its 
findings and its reasoning. It extends from 12 to 18 months the period during which 
former Commissioners “shall not lobby nor advocate with members of the 
Commission and their staff for her/his business, client or employer on matters for 
which they have been responsible within their portfolio”. It also introduces a clear 
procedure whereby the President of the Commission may re-allocate responsibility for 
a dossier in case of potential conflicts of interest while a Commissioner is still in 
office, explicitly bans Commissioners from recruiting spouses, partners or direct 
family members in their cabinet, enhances existing restrictions regarding gifts in the 
form of hospitality and obliges Commissioners to update their declaration of interests 
on an annual basis (European Commission, 2011). 
 
 
Conclusion 
Despite significant reforms in how the European Union works, in how its officials are 
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recruited and promoted and how its politicians are paid in the last 15 years, its image 
as a “gravy train” has hardly improved significantly.  Indeed, with the fiscal austerity 
following the 2008 financial crisis the central philosophy of ensuring independence 
from member states and making European service attractive to officials from 27 
member states seems almost guaranteed to enhance the impression of a gravy train.  
Yet the expenses involved in living (possibly temporarily) in a city like Brussels and 
the financial incentives needed to make people want to do it do not come cheap. 
Commission pay shows the difficulty, if not impossibility, of paying enough to make 
employment in the EU attractive while not outraging member state electorates.  In the 
UK, with a comparatively Eurosceptic electorate and a highly Eurosceptic press a pay 
rise in 2010 was condemned in the Daily Mail as, in the words of a Conservative MP, 
as a case of “self-serving Eurocrats [yet again] handing large amounts of our money 
to other self-serving Eurocrats”.  Yet the Commission and the British Government 
had for some time been concerned that the number of UK applicants to join the 
Commission’s civil service was far too low as those with the necessary qualifications 
(and the critical shortage in the UK is with language qualifications) were believed to 
be attracted to better paid jobs elsewhere. 
 
Answers to the question of whether salaries are "too high" will always vary according to 
the perspective of the person giving the answer as well as the factors taken into account 
and left out.  However, given the importance of the objective of recruiting officials of the 
right calibre from the right countries, and given the constraints of a common pay scale for 
all nationalities which has to maintain hierarchical distinctions in pay differentials, the 
argument for wages which appear generous by many national standards is not to be 
explained simply as EC officials having been successful in the pursuit of self-interest.  
Rather the pay system is a result of the current level of development of European 
integration, where supranational sentiments are not fully matched by the dropping of 
national interests.   While a worthy ideal, member states are only likely to tolerate true 
supranationality in recruitment in the lower echelons of the EC where 56 per cent of the 
employees come from Belgium, Luxembourg or Italy.  Among judges, MEPs and 
Commissioners formal national quotas determine the nationality of incumbents.  In 
between this, where official as well as unofficial quotas are illegal, member states appear 
to prefer to pay for a system which formally recognises the principle of supranationality 
in the senior ranks but which at the same time ensures that the top rank of the civil service 
contains acceptable numbers of their own citizens. 
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i Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 the Council 
meets in ten configurations (down from 22 in the 1990s). The distribution of 
responsibilities between government ministers at the national level is entirely a matter 
for each member state and does not always correspond to the distribution of tasks 
between the Council’s ten configurations. This is why the actual number of national 
government ministers who attend meetings of the Council is very high (in the 
hundreds). 
ii The President of the European Commission is also a member of the European 
Council his salary is paid out of the EU budget.   
iii For example, MEPs elected in Italy received €12,435 per month, while their 
colleagues who were elected in Hungary received 6.76% of that amount (€840 Euro) 
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per month (Euractiv, 23 June 2005, http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/meps-agree-
reform-salaries-travel-expenses/article-141439 
iv This is the number specified by the Treaty of Lisbon which entered into force in 
December 2009. 
v These are the European Defence Agency, the EU Institute for Security Studies and 
the EU Satellite Centre.   
vi These are the European Police College, the European Police Office and the EU’s 
Judicial Co-operation Unit.   
vii The key decisions are made by the ECB’s Governing Council which – addition to 
the six members of the Executive Board – includes the (at present 17) heads of 
national central banks of the members of the Euro-zone.  Unlike the former, the latter 
are not ECB (or indeed EU) employees but national officials, whose salaries are paid 
by the corresponding member state.  
viii The Ombudsman has the same rank in terms of remuneration, allowances and 
pension as a judge of the ECJ (European Parliament, 1994, Art. 10). 
ix These are distinct from Community institutions, have their own legal personality 
and have been set up to deal with specific (technical or managerial) tasks in the ‘first 
pillar’. They are the Community Fisheries Control Agency, the Community Plant 
Variety Office, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, the 
European Aviation Safety Agency, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control, the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, the 
European Chemicals Agency, the European Environment Agency, the European Food 
Safety Authority, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, the European Fundamental Rights Agency, the European GNSS 
Supervisory Authority, the European Maritime Safety Agency, the European 
Medicines Agency, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 
European Network and Information Security Agency, the European Railway Agency, 
European Training Foundation, the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
(Trade Marks and Designs) and the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European 
Union.   
x These are executive agencies set up for a fixed period and entrusted with the 
management of specific programmes.  They are the Research Executive Agency, the 
Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency, the Executive Agency for 
Health and Consumers, the Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation, 
the European Research Council Executive Agency and the European Audiovisual and 
Culture Executive Agency. 
xi This reform was adopted 26 years after the first direct European elections. 
xii This explains the fact that the politicians who were MEPs prior to the entry into 
force of the Statute and were since re-elected ‘may opt for the national system 
applicable hitherto in respect of the salary, transitional allowance and pensions for the 
entire duration of their membership of the European Parliament’ (Art. 25 (1)). 
xiii All conversions in this chapter are made at a rate of €1=£0.8775 and €1=$1.4275 
(April 2011). 
xiv This figure does not include €179,000 intended for flat-rate subsistence and 
representation allowances in connection with the duties of the EP’s President. 
xv In addition to the cost of carbon offsets, these include ordinary travel expenses (i.e. 
travel and subsistence expenses in connection with travelling to and from the places 
of work and with other duty travel), other travel expenses (i.e. travel expenses 
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incurred in the member state of election and repatriation expenses), general 
expenditure allowance (i.e. expenses resulting from the parliamentary activities of 
MEPs in the member state where they are elected).  
xvi This includes €250,000 for ‘exchange losses’ which is understandable since MEPs 
need to employ (and, consequently, remunerate) staff in the country where they are 
elected at a time when 10 of the 27 members of the EU do not use the Euro.   
xvii This is subject to the amendment of the Staff Regulations of officials of the 
European Communities and the conditions of employment of other servants of the 
European Communities (OJ L56, 4 March 1968, pp. 1-7) which requires the 
unanimous agreement of the Council. 
xviii Page and Wouters reported that in 1993 the EC’s contribution to the pension 
schemes of MEPs amounted to 7.7 million ECU 7.7m ECU or 14,882 ECU (£12,354) 
per MEP (Page and Wouters, 1994, p. 203). 
xix This corresponds to €23,169 approximately (i.e. £20,331 or $33,074) per MEP.  
xx This sum covers their remuneration and allowances, insurance against sickness, 
accident and occupational disease and other social security contributions, flat-rate 
overtime allowances, travel expenses for officials or temporary staff, their spouses 
and dependants from their place of employment to their place of origin, the impact of 
salary weightings applicable to remuneration and to the part of emoluments 
transferred to a country other than the country of employment, unemployment 
insurance for temporary staff and payments made by the institution to allow 
temporary staff to constitute or maintain pension rights in their country of origin. 
xxi The top grade (AD16) is an exception: it has three steps.   
xxii In grades C and D there was – as expected - a great preponderance of local 
employees, (Belgians and Luxembourgeois) as these grades are not generally subject 
to the Proporz  principle (Page and Wouters, 1994, p. 205). 
xxiii For these calculations we have used Eurostat’s population estimates for 2010 
(EUROSTAT, 2011) and the European Commission’s official staff figures (European 
Commission/Human Resources and Security DG, 2011a; 2011b).  
xxiv For example, senior civil servants in Whitehall who come from London do not 
receive higher pay than those who come from, say, South Wales and the salary of the 
British Prime Minister is not lower than that of a senior Treasury official. 
xxv This calculation is based on the 31 CVs found on the European Commission’s web 
site (http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/who/dg_en.htm accessed on 19 April 
2011) from which the CVs of five Directors General were missing.  
xxvi It is at least €472.70 per month. 
xxvii Children may be educated in the European School free of charge. 
xxviii For each dependent child who is less than five years old or is not yet in regular 
full-time attendance at a primary or secondary school, the amount of this allowance is 
fixed at €85,14. 
xxix  It amounts to €177.22 if the distance is between 725 km and 1450 km, and 
€354.41 if it is greater than 1450 km. 
xxx The Commission produces a comprehensive report every three years on the 
recruitment requirements of the institutions and transmits it to the European 
Parliament and the Council, i.e. the two branches of the EU’s budgetary authority. On 
the basis of this report the Commission, if necessary, presents proposals based on all 
relevant factors to the Council after consulting the other institutions within the 
framework of the Staff Regulations (Art. 2, Annex XI, Staff Regulations). 
xxxi This entitlement also applies irrespective of length of service, if an official is over 
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the age of 63, if it has not been possible to reinstate him during a period of non-active 
status or in the event of retirement in the interests of the service. 
xxxii His links to that company go way back. In the early 1990s he created a high level 
group to outline the EU’s strategy on information highways. Candido Velazquez, then 
president of Telefonica, was a member of the group (Financial Times, 2 July 1999, p. 
2). 
 
